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Electoral Competition and Social  
Spending in the Argentine Provinces 
Lucas González 
Abstract: What is the effect of political competition on subnational 
social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for 
original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 
and 2009, the study finds that social spending increases the more elec-
torally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. It 
also finds that other arguments in the literature are relevant in explaining 
variations on types of spending, such as partisan fragmentation in the 
districts. The article discusses these findings for the Argentine provinces 
and explores their implications with regard to the debates on the effects 
of electoral competition and the design of social policies, especially in 
developing countries and federal democracies. 
  Manuscript received 26 April 2016; accepted 3 March 2017 
Keywords: Argentina, social spending, provinces, governors 
Lucas González holds a PhD in political science from the University of 
Notre Dame. His research interests are federalism, redistribution, and 
the political economy of redistributive transfers. He is a researcher at the 
National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET), 
professor at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín, and researcher at 
the Universidad Católica Argentina. He recently published a book with 
Routledge and has coauthored two others. He has also written articles 
for edited volumes and peer-reviewed journals, the last of which were 
published in The Journal of Politics, Latin American Research Review, Latin 
American Politics and Society, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, among others. 
E-mail: <lgonzalez@unsam.edu.ar>; <lucas_gonzalez@uca.edu.ar> 
 
  
  92 Lucas González 
 
Introduction 
Electoral competition is a fundamental feature of democratic regimes 
(Dahl 1973). Despite broad agreement among scholars on this, there is 
still considerable debate on its effects on public policies. Spending on 
health, education, and social welfare is an essential part of what govern-
ments do to improve the quality of life of their citizens and the founda-
tions of human capital in their societies (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 
2008: 420). Furthermore, these expenditures are fundamental for correct-
ing structural problems in historically unequal countries, where large 
portions of their populations live below the poverty line. Given that 
electoral competition is a crucial feature of democratic regimes and social 
spending is essential to improving the quality of life of citizens, this study 
examines whether these two variables are positively or negatively related 
to each other.1 
One of the most established theoretical expectations of coalitional 
theories is that in the context of greater electoral competition, politicians 
(and their parties) focus on electoral survival strategies because electoral 
contests are more uncertain. This vote-seeking strategy has an impact on 
government spending since politicians tend to allocate more budget on 
particularistic goods in order to secure votes (Schlesinger 1965; Strom 
1990: 582), and reduce spending on social policies. As Strom (1990: 565) 
claims, models of competitive political party behavior are useful for 
analyzing interparty electoral competition and coalitional behavior. But 
“these models suffer from various theoretical and empirical limitations, 
and the conditions under which each model applies are not well speci-
fied.” On top of that, there are still large disagreements at the theoretical 
level, and studies that examine the effects of political competition on the 
type of government spending have produced mixed empirical results. 
Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budg-
et panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, I 
show that social spending increases the more secure incumbents are 
                                                 
1  Acknowledgments: The author thankfully acknowledges the helpful comments 
of Carlos Acuña, Germán Lodola, Marcelo Nazareno, the two anonymous 
JPLA reviewers, and the JPLA editor. Julia Rubio and Belén Cáceres provided 
crucial research assistance for this project. Special thanks to them and to Rocío 
Moris, who also helped in the analysis of Córdoba and Buenos Aires. Many 
thanks also to Matías Bianchi, who provided helpful data to analyze San Luis, 
Gloria Trocello, and Carlos Varetto, who shared his data on the provincial ef-
fective number of parties of the Argentine provinces. The National Council for 
Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) provided partial funding for 
this project. 
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electorally (i.e., when electoral risks are lower) and the longer they have 
been in office. Electorally secure governors can reduce the transaction 
costs of politics, face less pressure from their electoral partners, and do 
not have to distribute many positions among political allies. They can 
also diminish turnover in executive positions by appointing loyal staff in 
key positions and having more control over the bureaucracy. These con-
ditions favor social spending, which allows governors to target broader 
electorates and further their political careers outside the province. 
Argentine provinces are particularly valuable for studying the de-
terminants of social spending. First, there is enormous variation in the 
share of the budget they allocate to total social spending (between 41 
percent and 84 percent).2 If we only take into account the share of social 
spending that is neither earmarked nor regulated by federal laws (exclud-
ing pensions and social security), the variation is even larger, ranging 
between 7 percent and 40 percent of the budget. The minimum values 
for the group that spends the least on social infrastructure are almost 
nine times lower than the maximum values for the group that spends the 
most. 
Second, many of the possible independent variables presented in 
the literature vary considerably between provinces, such as electoral 
competition, the level of economic development, and reelection limits. 
Therefore, it is not immediately obvious which are the factors associated 
with increased social spending in the Argentine provinces. 
In addition, there are many other variables that can be controlled 
since they do not vary among provinces, such as federal institutions 
(system of government, federal institutions; Huber, Mustillo, and Ste-
phens 2008: 429), cultural factors (ethnic, religious, or linguistic fragmen-
tation between districts; relevant in other countries like India, South 
Africa, or Nigeria), and other nonobservable factors of possible explana-
tory relevance that may vary substantially among nations (Weitz-Shapiro 
2012: 572; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004: 153; Snyder 2001). 
The relevance of the case study goes beyond methodological as-
pects. Previous studies indicate that provincial social spending is the 
variable that best correlates with improvements in human development 
indicators (health, education, and personal income) and the reduction of 
poverty (González 2014: 181). Thus, I believe that studying what makes 
this kind of spending vary is normatively, socially, and politically im-
portant. 
                                                 
2  Total social spending includes expenditures on health, education, social welfare 
programs, social infrastructure, pensions, and social security. See definitions in 
the next section and more details in the Data and Method section.  
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Like Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004: 164), I focus on provincial 
governments rather than on municipalities for the delivery of public 
goods because of the nature of Argentine federalism. Argentina, like 
India, is a federal system in which a lot of administrative power is dele-
gated to provincial governments and in which local governments possess 
very little fiscal or administrative autonomy. 
The rest of the article continues as follows: First, I define the main 
concepts and discuss the literature on the topic. Second, I present the 
main argument and other hypotheses from the literature. Third, I opera-
tionalize the variables, provide the data sources, and identify the meth-
odological strategy. Fourth, I present and discuss the empirical results. 
Finally, I explore their comparative implications in the conclusion. 
Definitions 
There is a significant discussion in the literature about how to conceptu-
alize (and operationalize) different types of governmental spending. To 
define the dependent variable, which is social spending, I start with a 
broad definition of public goods. Public goods are indivisible and non-
excludable, benefit everyone, potentially increase social welfare (Bueno 
de Mezquita et al. 2003: 58; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), are desired by all in a society (Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007), cannot be denied to anyone (Lodola 2010), and are 
distributed as the result of the application of codified and universal rules 
(Kitschelt 2000; Armesto 2012). Private or particularistic goods are those 
that benefit a few (Bueno de Mezquita et al. 2003: 58), are granted only 
to certain citizens or specific categories of people (Lodola 2010), and are 
both selective and reversible (Stokes 2007; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and 
Estevez 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).3 
                                                 
3  The concept of social spending does not relate to patronage, clientelism, or 
vote buying. Some authors define expenditure on private or particularist goods, 
especially on personnel or public employment, as patronage (Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Remmer 2007; Melo and Pereira 2013; Robinson and Verdier 2013). 
Others consider this type of spending as clientelism (Stokes 2007; Magaloni, 
Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Zarazaga 2014; 
Szwarcberg 2015) or vote buying (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Nichter 
2008), which involves the exchange of public resources (typically public em-
ployment) for electoral support. Due to the complexity in observing the ex-
changes between politicians handing over public resources and voters support-
ing them at the polling station, and to avoid the difficulties of measuring clien-
telism, a part of the literature has been trying to define and compare govern-
ment spending on different goods and services (Weitz-Shapiro 2012: 569). 
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In this study I analyze spending on a specific group of public goods, 
which I call social spending. Social spending comprises programmatic 
spending on health, education, and social infrastructure (e.g., schools, 
hospitals, housing and urban development, and health infrastructure) – 
all of which are public goods. I also include programmatic social welfare 
programs in the definition of social spending, which are technically not 
universal or excludable.4 
The definition of social spending excludes legally required expendi-
tures (e.g., on basic education and primary health care) and expenditures 
on pensions and social security.5 The main reason for this decision is that 
these budget items significantly reduce variation of the dependent varia-
ble across districts. Social spending, as defined, is not regulated by feder-
al laws, and each province decides autonomously the share of the budget 
it allocates to social spending, which substantially increases variation of 
the dependent variable across districts (see the section on Methodology 
and Data). 
Electoral Competition and Social Spending 
When do politicians seek votes or office in and for themselves? And 
when do they advocate policies? One of the most established theoretical 
expectations of the coalitional theory literature is that the greater the 
competitiveness (and the larger the uncertainty of electoral contests), the 
more politicians (and their parties) are forced to focus on electoral sur-
vival, secure their votes, and, hence, spend on particularistic goods 
(Schlesinger 1965; Strom 1990: 582). Along the lines of coalitional theo-
ry, several authors argue that an increase in party competition augments 
politicians’ electoral survival strategies, which has a positive effect on 
                                                                                                    
These studies focus on the analysis of the determinants of government spend-
ing patterns (rather than their electoral effects). I follow this strategy. 
4  Some authors (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Nazareno, Stokes, and 
Brusco 2006; Zarazaga 2014; Szwarcberg 2015) claim that many social welfare 
programs in Argentina are clientelistic. See footnote 2 for a conceptual discus-
sion on clientelism and government spending. 
5  Primary and secondary education has been in the hands of the Argentine prov-
inces since 1992 (some provinces were granted administration powers for these 
services in 1978, during military rule) as well as the vast majority of former na-
tional hospitals. While provinces are responsible for health care and both pri-
mary and secondary education, they have a great degree of autonomy over their 
budgets and how much they allocate to each of these functions. In Brazil, by 
contrast, federal laws require states to allocate minimum values for each of 
these budget items. 
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personnel spending and a negative effect on social spending (Dawson 
and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Persson and Tabellini 1999; Magaloni, 
Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007).  
Bueno de Mezquita et al. (2003: 8, 104) claim that “When the coali-
tion is small, leaders focus on providing their small number of essential 
supporters with private benefits.” The incumbent party tends to spend 
more on public goods when the winning coalition is larger (implying less 
political competition), because public goods benefit a larger number of 
supporters in a more homogeneous way. In other words, it becomes 
harder to buy political loyalty with private goods as the size of the win-
ning coalition increases (Bueno de Mezquita et al. 2003: 8, 55–56). 
Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004: 162) offer a simple explanation of this 
phenomenon, stating that  
Excessive reliance on any one group can isolate other groups from 
supporting the party and therefore parties must build broad, 
cross-cleavage coalitions if they are to stand a chance of winning 
the election. 
A first group of comparative studies finds empirical support for these 
claims. Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez (2007: 188, 201–202), for 
instance, discover that spending on private goods in Mexican states in-
creases whenever there is greater political competition and electoral risks 
are at their highest. This is because public goods represent a riskier op-
tion than private goods, which produce more effective results but offer 
smaller electoral benefits. Remmer (2007: 369) and Melo and Pereira 
(2013: 94) also find that provincial governments in Argentina and Brazil 
spend more on private goods when the incumbent’s electoral base is 
smaller.  
A second body of literature argues that an increase in party compe-
tition has a positive effect on social spending. According to these argu-
ments, conditions of high party competitiveness reduce a party’s ability 
to use state resources to further its political agenda due to monitoring by 
the political opposition, the credible threat of being replaced (Grzymala-
Busse 2007), or greater pressure to be responsive to constituents and 
enact policies that will make it popular during elections (Boyne 1994: 
210; Hecock 2006: 954; see Weitz-Shapiro 2012: 570).  
A third lot of studies contend that the relationship between political 
competition and type of spending is conditional on the level of political 
competition (Melo and Pereira 2013: 94) or how political competition 
interacts with other demographical variables, primarily poverty (Weitz-
Shapiro 2012). The core assumption according to a significant part of 
this body of literature is that lower-income or low-education voters are 
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most sensitive to spending on public employment (patronage for Calvo 
and Murillo 2004: 743 or clientelism for Weitz-Shapiro 2012).  
A fourth body of research only offers mixed empirical evidence. In 
an early study, Pulsipher and Weatherby (1968) observe that an increase 
in partisan competition in the United States has a positive effect on edu-
cation spending, no effect on public health spending, and a negative 
effect on housing and urban development. These mixed results were also 
found at the subnational level (at the state level in the United States and 
at the local level in the United Kingdom; see Solé-Ollé 2006: 146 for a 
discussion). 
The main motivations of this paper are both theoretical and empiri-
cal. Theoretically, the literature is far from agreeing on what effect politi-
cal competition has on the type of spending. I propose to further specify 
the expected effect of electoral competition on social spending by in-
cluding not only electoral but also governing dynamics. Currently, the 
literature focuses mainly on electoral expectations, risks, and motiva-
tions. Given the mixed results in the literature, this article empirically 
examines whether there is a systematic relationship between these varia-
bles in the Argentine provinces, taking advantage of the high variation in 
the outcome variable and the possibilities of statistical control among 
districts. Solé-Ollé (2006: 146) notes there is not a lot of accumulated 
empirical evidence to suggest that the intensity of party competition 
affects policy outcomes. This paper aims to contribute further to this 
discussion by providing new empirical evidence on the link between 
these variables. 
Electoral Security and Social Spending 
The main argument of this study is that governors increase social spend-
ing when they enjoy greater electoral security in their districts – that is, 
when their electoral base is broader and they face less competition. Part 
of the literature predicts the same outcome in situations where there is 
less need to secure votes through particularistic goods (Schlesinger 1965; 
Strom 1990: 582) and where social spending is expected to have larger 
electoral benefits (Bueno de Mezquita et al. 2003; Chhibber and Noorud-
din 2004; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007).  
I expect social spending to increase (and personnel spending to de-
cline) the safer governors are electorally, the more secure they are politi-
cally, and the longer they have been in office. Two main reasons underlie 
this expectation. The first one is linked to electoral dynamics. At the 
beginning of their terms in office, governors need to build political sup-
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port to govern. In order to do that, they distribute key positions among 
political allies or among those who helped them win the election. Gov-
ernors tend to distribute such positions more widely in cases where they 
only win by a small margin and thus need to reward more electoral allies, 
which increases the transaction costs of politics. If governors enjoy large 
electoral support, they face less pressure from electoral partners to spend 
on personnel and less need to spend on private goods for specific groups 
or party sectors. In short, electorally secure governors can reduce the 
transaction costs of politics. Hence (and here is the link with the litera-
ture), they tend to allocate more to social spending and distribute public 
goods to a wider group of voters since doing so produces greater elec-
toral benefits (as argued by Bueno de Mezquita et al. 2003: 55–56; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004: 153–154; 
and Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007: 188, 201–202). There-
fore, I expect “strong” governors (i.e., those with a larger share of votes 
and seats) to allocate more to social spending to increase their (or their 
parties’) chances of reelection. As some scholars in the coalition theory 
debate point out, office seeking can be seen as a constant-sum game 
(instead of a zero-sum game) (Riker 1962; Budge and Laver 1986: 486; 
Strom 1990), in which rational politicians engage in government spend-
ing that benefits a broad set of voters. Office seeking and policy seeking 
do not conflict with each other in this scenario (Budge and Laver 1986: 
487). On the contrary, because “weak” governors (i.e., those with fewer 
votes and seats) face more competition and do not have unitary authority 
over the political agenda, office seeking becomes zero-sum and more 
incompatible with policy goals. As Schlesinger (1965) and Strom (1990: 
582, 588) claim, the greater the competitiveness and uncertainty of elec-
toral contests, the more parties are forced to focus on electoral survival. 
The second reason is associated with governing dynamics. Turnover 
in executive positions tends to decrease the more electorally secure gov-
ernors are and the longer they have been in office. Under these circum-
stances electorally secure governors are more capable of appointing loyal 
staff to key positions, have greater control over the provincial bureaucra-
cy, and thus have more leverage over the budget. This allows them to 
increase social spending.6 
To sum up, the main hypothesis is that governors who are more se-
cure in electoral and legislative terms will allocate more to social spend-
                                                 
6  We can add a third reason related to career dynamics. Electorally secure gover-
nors engage in more social spending in order to publicize their policy results 
and further their political careers outside of their respective provinces. This can 
be further explored in other studies. 
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ing (and less personnel spending). I measure electoral and legislative 
security by calculating governors’ electoral and legislative power (model 
1) and number of years in office (model 2). 
When I use the concept of governors’ electoral and legislative pow-
er, I am basically referring to the governors’ electoral resources (i.e., their 
ability to obtain votes and win elections or maintain their level of popu-
larity among voters) and their ability to influence policy-making in the 
provincial legislature or during the bill approval process (Kousser and 
Philips 2012: 2). More precisely, in this study governors’ electoral and 
legislative power is an index consisting of three dimensions: (a) electoral 
support (vote share), (b) legislative support (share of seats in the provin-
cial legislature), and (c) control over the state legislature (dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the main party in the legislature is the gover-
nor’s party).7 The index is a composite measure of the shares of votes 
and legislative seats and the dummy variable.8 
Other Hypotheses in the Literature 
Following partisan arguments, social spending should decrease (and 
personnel spending should increase) if party system fragmentation in the 
district augments, because such fragmentation raises the transaction 
costs of politics (model 3). Some authors argue that bipartisan systems 
tend to generate more spending on public goods than multiparty systems 
(Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004: 153–154; Persson and Tabellini 2000). 
In a bipartisan system, governments face less pressure to focus their 
spending and provide private resources to specific groups in order to 
gain support. The key to these arguments lies in the incumbent’s elec-
toral support and the type of electorate: the greater the margin of sup-
port and the broader the electorate, the smaller the incentive for gover-
nors to focus spending on specific groups and the likelier they are to 
spend on public goods, as these are distributed evenly among a larger 
number of voters. The lower the margin of support and the more focal-
ized the electorate, the greater the incentives for governors to engage in 
particularistic spending. This argument is clearly complementary to mine. 
                                                 
7  Behind this measure is Riker’s (1962: 248) notion of a “minimum winning” 
electoral coalition. 
8  The dummy contributes 0.5 points to the index when it is codified as 1 to 
balance the effect of each measure. I assume that 50 percent of the electoral 
votes, 50 percent of the seats in the provincial legislature, and a situation in 
which the main party in the legislature is the governor’s party contribute equally 
in the index. The maximum possible value is 2.5 and the minimum is 0. 
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Some partisan arguments contend that the kind of political party is 
also an important factor to understand the budgetary decisions of pro-
vincial governors. For instance, Alesina (1987) and Alesina, Roubini, and 
Cohen (1999) highlight the importance of the ideological position of 
parties and find that leftist parties undertake more social spending than 
others. Several works have studied the partisan effect on social spending 
in the United States (for a discussion, see Snyder and Yackovlev 2000: 
12) and from a comparative perspective (for Brazil, see Santos and Batis-
ta 2014; Brambor and Ceneviva 2013), finding a small or unclear effect. 
This argument poses problems in partisan contexts where party ideology 
is not easily identifiable beforehand, as is the case with the Partido Justi-
cialista (PJ) in many Argentine provinces. The PJ’s status as a leftist or 
rightist party will greatly depend on the type of public policy it imple-
ments once in office. In any case, I empirically analyze whether there is 
variation in social spending according to the type of party in the provin-
cial government (model 3). 
In relation to institutional factors, some authors highlight the role 
of institutional checks and balances of subnational units (Melo and Pe-
reira 2013: 94) or the influence of electoral rules on the type of spending 
(Remmer 2007; Melo and Pereira 2013). Unfortunately, I have no data 
on the functioning of provincial checks and balances in Argentina. But I 
do examine whether social spending decreases during election years 
(Remmer 2007: 369) and during a governor’s last term in office (Melo 
and Pereira 2013: 94). In particular, I test whether social spending varies 
during presidential and gubernatorial election years (model 4; I report 
only presidential elections in Table 1) and according to the number of 
years a governor has been in office (model 2). 
I also run controls in the previous models to account for structural 
arguments that claim social-spending levels are related to socioeconomic 
development (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Magaloni, Diaz-
Cayeros, and Estevez 2007; Melo and Pereira 2013; Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco 2006; Stokes 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 
2012). I analyze whether there is any relationship between a district’s 
average GDP per capita, the rate of national economic growth, and the 
poverty level in the province in a given year (using data from unsatisfied 
basic needs). 
In a final model, I also include other variables to control for mobili-
zation, social unrest, and the fiscal structure of the province (model 5). 
Social spending should increase as the number of protests in a district 
grows (Lodola 2005). I have data on the number of protests in the prov-
inces (number of roadblocks and strikes in the public sector for the peri-
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od 1997–2007; Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría) to control for the 
effect of mobilization and social unrest on social spending. Huber, 
Mustillo, and Stephens (2008: 425) claim that fiscal deficits will sooner or 
later require austerity policies. Therefore, I could expect social spending 
to decline as the fiscal deficit in a district increases. Other authors also 
claim that patronage should increase with more fiscal dependency on 
federal transfers, which creates conditions for more provincial discretion 
in budget spending and, as a result, higher personnel expenses (Ardanaz, 
Leiras, and Tommasi 2012: 13). I control for the effect of fiscal depend-
ency on social spending by including data on provincial own revenue (as 
a share of total revenue). I do not include these latter control variables in 
all models because doing so would substantially diminish the number of 
observations and considerably augment collinearity (see analysis below). 
Data and Method 
I use data on social spending from the 23 Argentine provinces and the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires for the period 1993–2009. With re-
gard to social spending, I distinguish between legally required spending 
on primary health care and basic education, on the one hand, and 
noncompulsory spending (the budgets for which are autonomously de-
termined by the provinces), on the other hand. In this article social 
spending comprises expenditure on higher education, science and tech-
nology, cultural programs, social welfare programs, and social infrastruc-
ture (water and sewerage and housing and urban development). This 
definition excludes, as indicated above, spending on basic education and 
primary health care, as well as spending on pensions, and social security. 
I also exclude current spending on the operational functioning of the 
state (including general administration, justice, defense, and security).  
I compare the results from two types of models, those in which the 
dependent variable is social spending and those in which personnel 
spending is a percentage of total provincial spending, to explore similari-
ties and differences among their political determinants.  
Following Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008: 421), I report the 
dependent variable as the percentage of social spending of the total 
budget rather than focusing on changes in spending from year to year. 
This allows me to analyze the determinants of social spending patterns 
using the longest available time series (see also Hecock 2006). Moreover, 
because the Levin–Lin–Chu bias-adjusted test statistic t = -2.8081 is 
significantly less than zero (p<0.0025), I reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in favor of the alternative that the dependent variable is sta-
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tionary. Thus, I do not work with the yearly change in the dependent 
variable. 
The dependent variable is originally reported in million Argentine 
pesos for each province, the data for which was provided by the Direc-
torate for Analysis of Public Expenditure and Social Programs and the 
Directorate for National Fiscal Coordination with the Provinces. 
The Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test and a scatterplot for the 
error term in the main models indicate that there is heteroskedasticity in 
the error term, while the Wooldridge test reports autocorrelation in the 
panel data. A conventional way to test the different models is to use 
ordinary least-squares regression with panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE, Beck and Katz 1995) to compute the variance–covariance esti-
mates and the standard errors, assuming that the disturbances are het-
eroskedastic and correlated across panels. Following a similar study con-
ducted by Hecock (2006: 956) on the Mexican states, I also compute a 
generalized estimation equation (GEE) extension of generalized least-
squares estimation (Liang and Zeger 1986). This technique has the bene-
fit of producing estimators that are unaffected by autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity and is more appropriate for datasets with a low num-
ber of time components and relatively more panels (provinces). I report 
the GEE models in Table 1 and the PCSE models in Table 2 in the 
Appendix. The results remain very similar in the two model specifica-
tions. 
As in previous works on the subject (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 
2008: 428; Hecock 2006: 956), I do not include dummies for the prov-
inces in the study (even when running models with fixed effects, the 
results from the main model remain very similar). Clark and Linzer 
(2014) recommend random effects models for panels in which (a) varia-
tion is mainly observed among units (and not so much within them over 
time), (b) there are relatively few observations for each unit (in some 
models the minimum number of observations per unit is 5), and (c) the 
correlation between some independent variables (which change little 
over time, such as population and GDP per capita) and the dummies is 
high enough (even under violations of the zero-correlation assumption). 
These are all characteristics found in the panel I use here. Plumper, 
Troeger, and Manow (2005: 330–334), Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 
(2008: 429), and Hecock (2006: 956) similarly advise against including 
dummy variables for each unit in the models because (i) doing so lacks a 
theoretical basis, (ii) they eliminate cross-sectional variance, (iii) they are 
likely to be collinear with the variables that are important, (iv) they make 
it impossible to estimate the effect of exogenous time-invariant variables 
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(Wooldridge 2010), and (v) doing so severely skews the estimated effects 
of partially invariant variables over time (Beck 2001; Hecock 2006). Fi-
nally, the risk of omitted variable bias is smaller in the context of such 
similar units of analysis (i.e., provinces rather than countries; Hecock 
2006: 956). In spite of this, I run a Hausman test of random versus fixed 
effects to decide which of the two models is the most appropriate. The 
p-value for the full model using random and fixed effects is 0.1 for social 
spending and 0.43 for personnel spending (much larger than the advised 
0.05). Therefore, it is safe to use random effects models. 
I use models that correct for temporal and spatial autocorrelation 
and include variables that capture some of the main differences between 
provinces, which I believe account for changes in the dependent varia-
ble. As Achen (2000) has shown, including a lagged dependent variable 
may generate autocorrelation, distort the results, inflate the explanatory 
power of the lagged variable, improperly underestimate the explanatory 
power of other independent variables, or even reverse the signs of the 
coefficients. Hecock (2006: 956) does not include a lagged dependent 
variable either for the same reasons. According to Hecock, due to the 
limited number of years in a dataset and sporadic missing values for 
some states, including a lagged dependent variable can also seriously 
diminish the number of observations. Despite this, I also run PCSE 
models with a lagged dependent variable (see Table 3 in the Appendix), 
and compare the results with those from the GEE and PCSE models. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The percentage of the budget allocated by the provinces to social spend-
ing varies widely, with the lowest value (7.2 percent in Entre Ríos) being 
5.6 times smaller than the highest (40.1 percent in San Luis). The mean 
for all provinces between 1993 and 2009 is 16.3 percent, and the stand-
ard deviation is 5.77 percent. The mean values for the entire series for 
San Luis and the city of Buenos Aires are marginally higher than 28 per-
cent. These values are almost three times larger than those of the prov-
inces at the other end of the distribution, such as Córdoba and Entre 
Ríos (figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Social Spending by Province, 1993–2009 
 
Source:  Based on data from the Directorate for the Analysis of Public Expenditure and 
Social Programs at the Secretariat of Economic Policy.  
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Strikingly, the differences between political parties with regard to social 
spending in the provinces are minimal. For instance, mean social spend-
ing was 15.66 percent for the PJ and the 16.32 percent for the UCR – 
only a 0.66 difference. Provincial parties, however, had a slightly higher 
mean (figure 2). 
Figure 2. Social Spending by Party, 1993–2009 
 
Source:  Based on data from the Directorate for the Analysis of Public Expenditure and 
Social Programs at the Secretariat of Economic Policy. 
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Table 1.  Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) Regression Results 
(Models 1–5) 
Variables  Model 1: 
Governor Power 
Model 2: 
Years in Government 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Governor power 1.8453** 
(0.9059) 
-3.8185*** 
(1.4105) 
  
Years in office (more 
than 4 years) 
  0.4684*** 
(0.1549) 
-0.7168*** 
(0.2158) 
GDP per capita (ln) 4.5419*** 
(0.6599) 
-6.3705*** 
(1.0101) 
4.5169*** 
(1.2190) 
-2.8843* 
(1.5251) 
Population (%) 0.1217 
(0.8395) 
-0.1808 
(0.9514) 
0.2744 
(0.7946) 
-0.6279 
(0.9282) 
Poverty 
(% population UBN) 
-0.2555*** 
(0.0722) 
0.3332*** 
(0.1016) 
-0.0967 
(0.1146) 
0.2724* 
(0.1402) 
Economic growth 0.1143*** 
(0.0315) 
-0.2685*** 
(0.0487) 
0.0684 
(0.0639) 
-0.3594*** 
(0.0787) 
Constant -21.9030*** 
(7.2902) 
103.9884*** 
(10.6920) 
-24.8082** 
(12.3236) 
70.4328*** 
(15.3416) 
N 326 313 107 100 
Groups 24 24 18 18 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Variables/Models Model 3: 
Partisan Arguments 
Model 4: 
Presidential Election 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social Spend-
ing 
Personnel 
Spending 
Provincial party 1.6710*** 
(0.6164) 
1.4372 
(0.9444) 
  
ENP (ln) -2.5162*** 
(0.6448) 
3.0091*** 
(1.0012) 
  
 
Presidential election   -0.5499 
(0.5031) 
1.6619** 
(0.7612) 
GDP per capita (ln) 4.5806*** 
(0.6015) 
-7.7066*** 
(0.9163) 
4.8203*** 
(0.6230) 
-7.7691*** 
(0.9248) 
Population (%) 0.2582 
(0.9515) 
-0.2976 
(1.3385) 
-0.0237 
(0.8951) 
-0.5060 
(1.5036) 
Poverty 
(% population 
UBN) 
-0.3566*** 
(0.0694) 
0.5033*** 
(0.1031) 
-0.2658*** 
(0.0679) 
0.5534*** 
(0.1024) 
Economic growth 0.0793*** 
(0.0282) 
-0.2043*** 
(0.0424) 
0.1032*** 
(0.0293) 
-0.2449*** 
(0.0426) 
Constant -13.8167** 
(6.8265) 
102.1621*** 
(10.1906) 
-21.7243*** 
(6.7576) 
104.2448*** 
(10.2231) 
N 360 347 360 347 
Groups 24 24 24 24 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note:  Generalized estimation equation (GEE) regression results. The nonstandard-
ized regression coefficients are in the first line; the standard errors, in the sec-
ond. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Variables/Models Model 5: Full Model 
Social Spending Personnel Spending 
Governor power 1.6340* 
(1.2241) 
-2.8762* 
(1.5578) 
Presidential election 0.3824 
(0.7121) 
0.9628 
(0.9314) 
Own revenue 0.1677*** 
(0.0576) 
0.2085*** 
(0.0668) 
Deficit 0.0763*** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0467 
(0.0326) 
Social mobilization 0.0000 
(0.0032) 
0.0028 
(0.0042) 
GDP per capita (ln) 1.3790 
(1.2646) 
-2.1645 
(1.5511) 
Population (%) -1.9921** 
(0.8928) 
-1.4295 
(1.0249) 
Poverty 
(% population UBN) 
-0.0086 
(0.0716) 
0.3771*** 
(0.0869) 
Economic growth 0.0429 
(0.0421) 
-0.2812*** 
(0.0548) 
Constant -11.0349 
(10.6004) 
55.0962*** 
(13.0276) 
N 174 174 
Groups 24 24 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.0000 
Note:  Generalized estimation equation (GEE) regression results. The nonstandard-
ized regression coefficients are in the first line; the standard errors, in the sec-
ond. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
Regression Analysis  
The results of the regression models, reported in Table 1, support our 
main theoretical expectations. First, electorally secure governors tend to 
allocate a larger share of the provincial budget to social spending. Con-
trolling for third variables, a one-point increase in the governors’ elec-
toral and legislative power increases social spending by 1.85 percent 
(model 1). The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Fig-
ure 3 reports the predicted average marginal effect (with confidence 
intervals) of the previously fitted model. Controlling for third variables, 
we can see a positive marginal effect of gubernatorial power on the de-
pendent variable. 
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of Gubernatorial Power on Social 
Spending 
 
I also measure electoral security in government with the number of years 
in office. Although this variable is not statistically significant in explain-
ing changes in social spending, its coefficient is positive, robust, and 
statistically significant when the number of years in government is great-
er than four (more than one term in office). In model 2 we can see that 
after the first term and controlling for third variables, each additional 
year in office represents an average increase of 0.5 percent in social 
spending (statistically significant at the 0.001 level).9 After the second 
term (more than eight years in government), the coefficient for social 
spending is positive and rises to 1.4 percent (statistically significant at the 
0.001 level and identical in different model specifications). This reinforc-
es the argument that governors increase social spending when they are 
electorally secure and have been in office for several years. 
I compare these results with those of personnel spending as a per-
centage of the total provincial budget. In line with our theoretical expec-
                                                 
9  If we consider that a governor can typically govern for two consecutive terms 
of four years, at the end of a governor’s tenure the typical governor will have 
increased social spending by about 2 percent. 
  Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces 109
 

 
tations, a one-point increase in governors’ electoral and legislative power 
in model 1, while controlling for other variables, substantially decreases 
personnel spending by 3.8 percent (statistically significant at the 0.01 
level). An extra year in government decreases personnel spending by 0.25 
percent (statistically significant at the 0.01 level; these results are not 
reported in the table in order to save space); after four years in office, the 
coefficient in model 2 becomes even more robust (-0.7 percent; statisti-
cally significant at the 0.01 level). 
Substantive results remain almost identical in the PCSE models and 
quite similar in the lagged dependent variable models (see Tables 2 and 3 
in the Appendix). The number of years in government and partisan 
fragmentation produce the same substantive results in all model specifi-
cations. The coefficient for gubernatorial electoral and legislative power 
stays the same in the PCSE and lagged dependent variable models but 
loses statistical significance in model 1 in Table 3. Including a lagged 
dependent variable seriously diminishes the number of observations in 
some models (as Hecock suggests; 2006: 956), so these results should be 
interpreted with care. 
Some of the other arguments in the literature also receive empirical 
support. The level of party system fragmentation negatively affects social 
spending but has a positive effect on personnel spending. In model 3 
controlling for the usual variables and increasing the effective number of 
provincial parties by 1 percent decreases social spending by 2.5 percent 
but increases personnel spending by 3 percent (all coefficients are statis-
tically significant.) 
In model 3 we can see that, controlling for third variables, provin-
cial parties spend 1.7 percent more on social matters than the other par-
ties (the PJ and the UCR) (this coefficient is not statistically significant in 
the PCSE model). With regard to personnel spending, there are no statis-
tically significant results. These results and those in figure 2 indicate that 
the type of party in government is not relevant for explaining changes in 
the overall percentage of social spending. This finding is similar to that 
of Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008: 431, 433). 
Another interesting finding in model 4 is that governors do not ap-
pear to reduce social spending in election years (this coefficient is not 
statistically significant) but in fact seem to increase personnel spending 
(the coefficient for personnel spending is statistically significant only in 
model 4 of Table 1; none of these coefficients reach the standards of 
statistical significance in PCSE).  
Some structural controls seem relevant for explaining social spend-
ing. Richer districts (those with larger values of GDP per capita) tend to 
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allocate more social spending. Results are inconsistent across different 
models for poverty rates (the coefficient does not always reach levels of 
statistical significance).10 The main results for social and personnel 
spending remain fundamentally unchanged in model 5 in the GEE and 
PCSE regressions (although the coefficient for gubernatorial power loses 
statistical significance in the lagged dependent variable model). Model 5 
contains the main variables of models 1–4 and the usual controls. Some 
variables were not included in the full model because of high collinearity 
with other variables. These results should be interpreted with caution, 
though, since the number of observations decreases substantially once all 
the controls have been introduced and because some standard errors 
have high values.  
Social mobilization does not appear to influence either social or 
personnel spending. I also do not reach any substantial conclusions re-
garding fiscal determinants. The results indicate that wealthier districts 
(those with more own income) tend to have higher levels of social 
spending as well as higher levels of personnel spending. Increases in 
fiscal provincial deficits seem to be positively associated with slightly 
more social and slightly less personnel spending (although the coefficient 
for the latter is not statistically significant).  
The R-squares for the five different PCSE models oscillate between 
28 percent and 47 percent. These R-squares indicate that we still need 
better theories, models, and data to further understand the determinants 
of social spending. Case studies may help us to better understand how 
these variables operate and to identify potential idiosyncratic factors that 
affect social spending. In the next section I briefly explore three cases 
that could guide further in-depth analysis of the Argentine case. 
Three Cases: Buenos Aires, San Luis, and 
Córdoba  
I selected Buenos Aires province as one of the cases because it offers 
high variation across time of the main variables and because of its socio-
economic and political relevance. The province comprises more than a 
third of the country’s population and is economically and politically the 
                                                 
10  Arretche, Schlegel, and Ferrari (2016: 94–95) provide individual-level data 
showing how individual income and regional identities affect preferences for 
centralization or decentralization of authority in Brazil. Further studies could 
use individual-level data to test preferences for different types of spending 
across regions in federal countries. 
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most important district in Argentina. Here, I briefly discuss the evolution 
of government spending during Felipe Solá’s tenure (2002–2007) as the 
governor of Buenos Aires Province.11 Upon taking up the governorship 
following Carlos Ruckauf’s resignation, Solá did not have the support of 
the legislature, did not control the powerful apparatus of the Buenos 
Aires faction of the PJ, and faced strong opposition in 22 of the 29 most 
populated municipalities of the suburbs of Buenos Aires. Eduardo 
Duhalde, the province’s former governor and strongman, and his allies 
controlled all these political resources. In the legislature, the divisions 
Solá faced between the Kirchnerist (President Kirchner allies) and Du-
haldist (Duhalde allies) factions of the PJ were so intense that he threat-
ened to resign. 
Furthermore, he inherited a cabinet appointed by his predecessor. 
Despite appointing loyal partisans to key positions in the provincial ad-
ministration (general secretariat and secretary of government) and in 
politically sensitive areas, such as security and justice (controlling the 
police) and labor (negotiating with the unions), areas dealing with eco-
nomic affairs (Ministry of Economy and Public Works), production, 
health, and education, as well as the influential provincial bank, largely 
remained in the hands of politicians linked to the former governor. 
As we would expect, personnel spending reached historically high 
levels at the beginning of Solá’s tenure: 53.5 percent of the budget in 
2002 compared to the province’s 1993–2009 average of 49 percent. 
Meanwhile, social spending dropped to 15 percent, one of its lowest 
levels during the same period. During his second term in office, Solá 
sought to increase his influence in the provincial legislature by forming 
his own legislative delegation and curbing the influence of Peronism 
from the suburbs of Buenos Aires. By 2005, Solá had the support of 
Duhaldist senators and of the head of the lower chamber. This enabled 
Solá to increase the cohesion within his cabinet and contain Peronist 
disputes in the legislature. He also appointed his own cabinet with loyal 
ministers (mostly from the provincial interior) and promoted second-line 
officials to important government positions in the areas of health, educa-
tion, human development, and environment (Interview with former 
governor Felipe Solá, 20 December 2016). In the end, Solá amassed so 
much power, that he tried to run for reelection for a third term even 
though the provincial constitution bans doing so. As we would antici-
pate, during his second term, Solá significantly decreased personnel 
                                                 
11  Carlos Ruckauf governed from 1999 to 2002, the year in which he resigned to 
take over as Minister of Foreign Affairs under the presidency of Eduardo 
Duhalde. Felipe Solá followed him as governor. 
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spending by almost 10 percentage points (reaching 43.7 percent in 2005) 
and increased social spending by 2 percentage points (reaching almost 17 
percent in 2007). 
I picked San Luis – a small, sparsely populated province of 432,000 
inhabitants (according to the 2010 census) – as another case because its 
provincial government allocates the highest average share of its budget 
to social spending nationwide. In 1983, after the military dictatorship, 
Adolfo Rodriguez Saá (PJ) was elected governor by a narrow margin 
(3,873 votes), receiving 40.5 percent of the vote compared to the 37.3 
percent obtained by his Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) rival. In that elec-
tion, however, the UCR won the presidential vote (48.6 percent), the 
election for federal deputies (45.5 percent), and the mayoral elections in 
the province’s two main cities (San Luis and Villa Mercedes). 
As we would expect under conditions of high electoral competition, 
personnel spending reached very high values in San Luis, accounting for 
76 percent of the budget in 1983. Rodríguez Saá compensated electoral 
allies and used positions in office to co-opt PJ dissidents and the opposi-
tion. He came to power with the help of various PJ factions but began to 
incorporate allies into his party and co-opt the opposition shortly after 
taking office. He first co-opted key dissident Peronists from the list that 
lost the primaries and then critical political figures from opposition par-
ties, such as the Liberal Democratic Party (Bianchi 2013: 140). 
Adolfo Rodriguez Saá was elected five times, each time with more 
than 50 percent of the vote (in 1995 he won with 72 percent). This was 
possible because he amended the provincial constitution in 1987 in order 
to provide himself with the possibility of indefinite reelection. His 
amendments also enabled the overrepresentation of interior districts 
(which massively supported him) in the newly created provincial senate – 
a move that secured him control over the legislature. 
Adolfo Rodriguez Saá only left office when he was appointed inter-
im president of Argentina in 2001. He was replaced in office by his vice 
governor, who later resigned, thus allowing his brother, Alberto, to suc-
cessfully run for office. Alberto Rodriguez Saá was elected with 90.1 
percent of the vote in 2003 and reelected with 86.3 percent in 2007.12 
                                                 
12  The functioning of the political regime in the province of San Luis is not the 
main topic of this article. It is worth noting that the democratic “quality” of 
several of the province’s institutions is questioned by the opposition, various 
scholars, and parts of the local and national media. On the contrary, other ana-
lysts argue that stability in government generated benefits, mostly in the second 
ministerial lines, where there has been significant stability in office and compar-
atively high bureaucratic quality. 
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On average, San Luis governors took up office with 60 percent of 
the vote and controlled 63 percent of the seats in the local legislature 
(this was as high as 76 percent in 2003). Therefore, these governors en-
joyed enormous power over their cabinets, the legislature, and other 
government institutions. Electoral competition was low during this peri-
od: the effective number of parties (votes) for the governors’ election 
(1983–2003) diminished from 3.03 in 1983 to 1.22 in 2003 (the lowest 
value at the national level, followed by Santa Cruz [1.72] and Formosa 
[1.74]). 
In line with our theoretical expectations, these governors – who 
amassed significant political power and stability over 33 years in office – 
reduced personnel spending by more than 38 percentage points, from 76 
percent of the budget in 1983 to 37.6 percent in 2004 (Bianchi 2013: 
139). Meanwhile, they increased social spending by 25 percentage points, 
from 12 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 2007 (data are available only for 
these years).  
The San Luis governors invested heavily in social infrastructure, es-
pecially in housing. Their administrations built 43,202 new houses be-
tween 1983 and 2000, granting housing to a third of the province’s 
population. According to Bianchi (2013: 159), San Luis had the second-
lowest amount of investment in housing in 1983 (after La Rioja), repre-
senting 0.7 percent of national housing funds. However, by 1991, San 
Luis was seventh highest with 5.1 percent. The province’s investment in 
water infrastructure also skyrocketed, with the provincial government 
building 2,500 km of aqueducts between 1983 and 2003 (before 1983, 
the province only had 30 km of aqueducts).13 In 2003 the San Luis gov-
ernment launched the Social Inclusion Plan, its most ambitious social 
initiative. Any unemployed person over 18 years of age could apply for 
this universal access plan. By 2005, the initiative had about 45,000 bene-
ficiaries (about one-third of the economically active San Luis population 
and 2.2 times the number of state employees (Behrend 2007: 13)), ac-
counting for 18 percent of the provincial budget (Bianchi 2013: 164). 
I chose Córdoba as the other case given its status as Argentina’s 
second most important province in socioeconomic terms. It also has the 
lowest mean social spending levels in the country (10.3 percent of the 
budget).  
The UCR won comfortably in Córdoba at the provincial and mu-
nicipal levels in 1983. Eduardo Angeloz was elected governor with 55.8 
                                                 
13  The average number of kilometers of paved roads per year increased from 
17.42 km for the period 1976–1983 to 89.3 km for 1983–1991 (Bianchi 2013: 
159). 
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percent of the vote, with his nearest rival only securing 39.2 percent. 
During his first term, Angeloz reformed the provincial constitution, 
allowing him to run for reelection. He was subsequently reelected in 
1987 (by a small margin) and again in 1991. The amended constitution 
also introduced the so-called “governability clause”, which granted the 
winning party an automatic majority of 36 seats (out of a total of 66). In 
Córdoba this was a period of stable rule for the incumbent UCR party, 
whose governors obtained an average 51 percent of the vote and con-
trolled nearly 58 percent of the seats in the provincial legislature. As is to 
be expected, social spending was fairly stable (1 percent standard devia-
tion) and closer to the national mean during these years, accounting for 
11 percent on average. Despite this, personnel spending also remained 
high, averaging 52 percent with a standard deviation of 2.6 points. 
In 1999, as a result of a deep economic crisis and severe adjustment 
policies that divided the party and plunged popular support, the UCR 
lost its first election after four consecutive terms in office. Supported by 
President Menem (PJ), the winning PJ candidate for the governorship, 
José Manuel De la Sota, formed a center-right coalition called Union for 
Córdoba, comprising the PJ, the Democratic Center Union, Action for 
Change, and the Christian Democracy of Córdoba. 
At the beginning of his first term in office, and partly as a result of 
increased political competition and a fragmented and diverse electoral 
coalition, De la Sota increased personnel spending from 46.7 percent of 
the budget in 1998 to a peak of 52 percent in 2000. Once he had consol-
idated his power, he began to reduce personnel spending, taking it down 
to 36.6 by 2004.  
Social spending, on the contrary, plummeted to an average of 9 per-
cent of the budget under De la Sota, reaching a historical low of 8.4 
percent in 2001, the year of an acute economic crisis in the country. In 
fact, the average share of the budget allocated to social spending under 
the PJ administrations in Córdoba (1999–2009) was 9.9 percent. In con-
trast to the personnel-spending trend, social spending increased from 8.4 
percent in 2001 to 10.7 in 2009. Between 2001 and 2004 the provincial 
government constructed over 200 new schools (377,701 m2 of new 
school surface) through Plans 100 and 110 New Schools at a cost of 
ARS 537 million and 4,180 new houses. It also created the Municipal 
Assistance Program (PAM) to strengthen nutrition programs, medical 
care, and social assistance at the municipal level (Nazareno, Mazzalay, 
and Cingolani 2012: 262–263). 
In short, these cases show that the main variables seem to move in 
the expected direction, especially in the cases of Buenos Aires and San 
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Luis. More case studies can be valuable in complementing quantitative 
analyses and providing a more detailed and complex understanding of 
the relationships between variables. 
Discussion 
The results of the regression models and the analyses of the cases indi-
cate that the more secure governors are electorally and the longer they 
have been in office (particularly those who have completed a first term), 
the more they tend to invest in social spending. Governors with strong 
political support are under less pressure from their coalition partners to 
engage in particularistic spending, reduce turnover in executive positions 
by appointing loyal staff in key cabinet posts, and have more control of 
the bureaucracy and greater freedom to decide how to spend the provin-
cial budget. Under these conditions, governors increase social spending 
on goods that benefit a broader number of voters in order to expand 
their electoral base (as well as to show their achievements in office and 
advance their political careers outside the province). 
By contrast, electorally weak governors, especially those at the be-
ginning of their terms in office and those with less legislative support, 
need to distribute positions among their core electoral allies and build up 
political support to govern. On top of that, they face more cabinet divi-
sions and greater resistance from the bureaucracy. This results in them 
increasing personnel spending, which negatively impacts on social spend-
ing. I therefore contend that putting together an electoral and a govern-
ing coalition with low electoral and legislative support, within the context 
of fragmented party systems, has a negative effect on social-spending 
levels. The proposed theoretical argument and the empirical evidence I 
found seeks to further specify the effect of electoral competition on 
social spending by including not only electoral expectations but also 
governing dynamics. Future research could further explore this connec-
tion using cases from other countries. 
I also believe that the positive relationship between electoral securi-
ty and social spending I find in this study has not only important impli-
cations for the theoretical discussion on the effects of electoral competi-
tion or stability but also fundamental implications for the social policies 
that define development strategies, especially in developing countries and 
federal democracies. 
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Competencia Electoral y Gasto Social en las Provincias Argentinas 
Resumen: ¿Cuál es el efecto de la competencia política en el gasto social 
subnacional? Usando estadísticas descriptivas y modelos de regresión 
para datos presupuestarios de panel para las 24 provincias argentinas 
entre 1993 y 2009, el estudio encuentra que el gasto social aumenta 
cuando la seguridad electoral de los gobernadores crece y cuando tienen 
más años en el cargo. También se observa que otros argumentos en la 
literatura son relevantes para explicar las variaciones en los tipos de gas-
to, como la fragmentación partidaria en los distritos. El artículo discute 
estos hallazgos para las provincias argentinas y explora sus implicancias 
en relación a los debates sobre los efectos de la competencia electoral y 
el diseño de políticas sociales, especialmente en los países en desarrollo y 
las democracias federales. 
Palabras clave: Argentina, gasto social, provincias, gobernadores 
  
  Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces 121
 

 
Appendix 
Table 2. PCSE Regression Results (Models 1 to 5) 
Variables/Models Model 1: 
Governor Power 
Model 2: 
Years in Government 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Governor Power 1.7497** 
(0.8707) 
-6.8478*** 
(1.3847) 
  
Years in Office (more 
than 4 years) 
  0.6584*** 
(0.2025) 
-0.4062* 
(0.2282) 
GDP per capita (ln) 5.9624*** 
(0.3739) 
-2.7708*** 
(0.8692) 
4.6063*** 
(0.6218) 
-0.0927 
(1.1968) 
Population (%) 0.5297 
(2.1273) 
0.4941 
(3.1785) 
0.8186 
(3.4941) 
1.0168 
(3.8436) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
0.1334*** 
(0.0363) 
0.1818*** 
(0.0547) 
0.1632** 
(0.0671) 
0.3185*** 
(0.0908) 
Economic Growth 0.1118** 
(.0471) 
-0.3632*** 
(0.0937) 
0.1047* 
(0.0551) 
-0.4322*** 
(0.1201) 
Constant -44.0402*** 
(4.2092) 
80.7865*** 
(8.8805) 
-34.3650*** 
(6.8777) 
44.0980*** 
(12.6018) 
N 326 313 107 100 
Groups 24 24 18 18 
R squared 0.3727 0.3613 0.3610 0.3488 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Variables/Models Model 3: 
Partisan Arguments 
Model 4: 
Presidential Election 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Provincial Party 0.1286 
(0.8470) 
2.1705** 
(1.0359) 
  
ENP (ln) -1.8016** 
(0.7713) 
5.5125*** 
(1.3112) 
  
Presidential Election   0.2096 
(0.7807) 
-1.4073 
(2.1662) 
GDP per capita (ln) 6.2157*** 
(0.5688) 
-3.472*** 
(1.0551) 
6.0091*** 
(0.4139) 
-2.0137** 
(0.9625) 
Population (%) 0.2837 
(1.8589) 
1.7079 
(2.8733) 
-0.9691 
(2.2835) 
5.2666 
(3.4372) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
0.1191*** 
(0.0438) 
0.1751*** 
(0.0593) 
0.1298*** 
(0.0329) 
0.1901*** 
(0.0552) 
Economic Growth 0.0627 
(0.0463) 
-0.2982*** 
(0.1145) 
0.0731 
(0.0444) 
-0.3300*** 
(0.1208) 
Constant -40.7769*** 
(5.9214) 
70.2082*** 
(10.8674) 
-41.1792*** 
(4.3140) 
63.3761*** 
(9.5391) 
N 360 347 360 347 
Groups 24 24 24 24 
R squared 0.3649 0.3443 0.3565 0.2785 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
  122 Lucas González 
 
Variables/Models Model 5: Full Model 
Social Spending Personnel Spending 
Governor Power 1.8200* 
(1.0209) 
-1.7563* 
(1.1019) 
Presidential Election 0.8390** 
(0.4226) 
1.3824 
(1.5945) 
Own Revenue 0.0987*** 
(0.0134) 
0.1879*** 
(0.0163) 
Deficit 0.1415*** 
(0.0358) 
-0.0607* 
(0.0357) 
Social Mobilization 0.0024 
(0.0034) 
0.0009 
(0.0031) 
GDP per capita (ln) 4.2187*** 
(0.5684) 
-0.8920 
(0.7310) 
Population (%) -2.1794 
(2.5240) 
-15.5611*** 
(4.3815) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
0.1834*** 
(0.0462) 
0.3832*** 
(0.0573) 
Economic Growth -0.0531 
(0.0407) 
-0.2942*** 
(0.0866) 
Constant -32.4653*** 
(5.5261) 
48.7221*** 
(7.7319) 
N 174 174 
Groups 24 24 
R squared 0.4675 0.4702 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.0000 
Note:  Ordinary Minimum Square Regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). The non-standardized regression coefficients are in the first line, the 
standard errors in the second. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Table 3. PCSE Regression Results (Models 1 to 5) 
Variables/Models Model 1: 
Governor Power 
Model 2: 
Years in Government 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social 
Spending 
Personnel 
Spending 
Lagged DV 
 
0.8541*** 
(0.0581) 
0.7081*** 
(0.0531) 
0.8027*** 
(0.1095) 
0.6694*** 
(0.0861) 
Governor Power 0.2595 
(0.5720) 
-1.8569** 
(0.8851) 
  
Years in Office (more 
than 4 years) 
  0.2421* 
(0.1485) 
-0.2636* 
(0.1752) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.3893 
(0.4729) 
0.4458 
(0.5659) 
0.1726 
(0.7785) 
1.9300*** 
(0.5912) 
Population (%) -0.1550 
(0.1046) 
0.3294* 
(0.1891) 
-0.1520 
(0.2518) 
0.4632** 
(0.2153) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
-0.0160 
(0.0324) 
0.1323*** 
(0.0411) 
-0.0154 
(0.0581) 
0.1949*** 
(0.0571) 
Economic Growth 0.1108*** 
(0.0352) 
-0.2877*** 
(0.0611) 
0.1023* 
(0.0584) 
-0.4102*** 
(0.0842) 
Constant -1.8563 
(4.3227) 
11.6997* 
(6.1678) 
-0.3389 
(6.8996) 
-2.0446 
(6.5932) 
N 307 310 103 97 
Groups 24 24 18 18 
R squared 0.7948 0.7045 0.7057 0.6756 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Variables/Models Model 3: 
Partisan Arguments 
Model 4: 
Presidential Election 
Social Spend-
ing 
Personnel 
Spending 
Social Spend-
ing 
Personnel 
Spending 
Lagged DV 
 
0.8651*** 
(0.0545) 
0.7204*** 
(0.0529) 
0.8687*** 
(0.0551) 
0.7432*** 
(0.0497) 
Provincial Party 0.3256 
(0.4392) 
0.4339 
(0.7560) 
  
ENP (ln) -0.6027 
(0.5051) 
1.5183* 
(0.8630) 
  
Presidential Election   0.3565 
(0.6287) 
-1.2994 
(1.1447) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.3166 
(0.5085) 
0.3561 
(0.6263) 
0.2520 
(0.4939) 
0.9498* 
(0.5329) 
Population (%) -0.1083 
(0.1010) 
0.3811** 
(0.1939) 
-0.1706* 
(0.1022) 
0.5408*** 
(0.1674) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
-0.0233 
(0.0336) 
0.1222*** 
(0.0450) 
-0.0168 
(0.0307) 
0.1269*** 
(0.0426) 
Economic Growth 0.0972*** 
(0.0365) 
-0.2657*** 
(0.0677) 
0.0951*** 
(0.0363) 
-0.2596*** 
(0.0651) 
Constant 0.1614 
(4.6207) 
7.5910 
(6.1450) 
-0.3821 
(4.3798) 
3.5382 
(5.0251) 
N 336 344 336 344 
Groups 24 24 24 24 
R squared 0.7965 0.7075 0.7959 0.7067 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Variables/Models Model 7: Full Model 
Social Spending Personnel Spending 
Lagged DV 
 
0.7495*** 
(0.1074) 
0.6899*** 
(0.0869) 
Governor Power 0.6228 
(0.6474) 
-1.0817 
(0.9410) 
Presidential Election 1.1721** 
(0.5386) 
-2.2400* 
(1.1833) 
Own Revenue 0.0495* 
(0.0282) 
0.0617** 
(0.0303) 
Deficit 0.0849*** 
(0.0188) 
-0.0606** 
(0.0259) 
Social Mobilization 0.0039** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0038* 
(0.0022) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.1608 
(0.7675) 
0.1040 
(0.8947) 
Population (%) -0.6018 
(0.3748) 
-0.1598 
(0.5385) 
Poverty 
(% Population UBN) 
0.0281 
(0.0472) 
0.1231** 
(0.0538) 
Economic Growth 0.0232 
(0.0289) 
-0.2264*** 
(0.0592) 
Constant -0.2972 
(6.8043) 
11.9612 
(8.2912) 
N 174 174 
Groups 24 24 
R squared 0.7946 0.7129 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.0000 
Note:  Ordinary Minimum Square Regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE). The non-standardized regression coefficients are in the first line, the 
standard errors in the second. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
